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BIANNUAL SURVEY
most of the motions to dismiss,20 1 the instant case reminds
practitioners that the coin is not entirely one-sided. The practitioner
should note the emphasis placed on the detailed statements in the
affidavits of merit which indicated a strong case on the petitioner's
behalf. The weight of the case's merits were such, held the court,
as to overcome the admittedly "weak" excuses for the delay in
prosecution.
Relevant to any motion to dismiss for neglect to prosecute is
the 1964 amendment of CPLR 3216. The amendment is extensively
treated in the May 1964 installment of the "Biannual Survey." 205
Rule 3211-Motion to dismiss searches the record.
In Schoonmaker v. Schoonmaker,20 6 the trial court -granted
the wife's motion to dismiss affirmative defenses of the husband
in accordance with CPLR 3211(b). The appellate division, citing
CPLR 3211 (c), stated that the "motion to dismiss affirmative
defenses searches the record." 207 In reviewing the record, the
court declared that "the cause of action as presently pleaded is
defective," 20s and dismissed the case though defendant had not
cross-moved for such dismissal. The court, therefore, never had
to deal with the affirmative defenses.
This case illustrates an important aspect of. a motion to
dismiss. Upon such a motion, both. parties may submit, the
same proof to the court as would be periitted on a motion for
summary judgment. Under the CPLR, the court is expressly
empowered to treat the 3211 motion to dismiss as a summary
judgment motion.209
Rule 109 of the Rules of Civil Practice provided for a motion
to strike a defense. It further provided that if the court finds
on such a motion that the complaint does not state a cause of
action it may dismiss the complaint "even in the absence of a
crosp motion."
Rule 3211 lacks this explicit language. But rule 3212, the
summary judgment provision, has such language210 The statement
contained in 3211(c) permitting a 3211 motion to be treated as a
summary judgment motion would appear to be all the authority
needed to apply to a 3211 motion that part of 3212 which permits
the summary judgment motion to search the record.
2047B McKINNEY's CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 78 (1964).
205 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 461 (1964).
20821 App. Div. 2d 777, 250 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1st Dep't 1964).2 07 Schoonmaker v. Schoonmaker, 21 App. Div. 2d 777, -, 250 N.Y.S.2d 979,
980 (1st Dep't 1964).203 1d. at-, 250 N.Y.S2d at 980.
209 CPLR 3211 (c).
210 See the last sentence of CPLR 3212 (b).
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This case illustrates a method by which a defendant may
end up with a judgment under 3211 for which he had not even
moved. If should make plaintiffs aware of a possible pitfall in
moving under 3211(b).
Summary judgment may be granted i a summary proceeding.
The appellate term of the first department has held that a
"summary judgment device is applicable to summary proceedings." 211
The holding arose out of a summary proceeding brought to oust
holdover tenants wherein the landlord moved for summary judg-
ment and to dismiss an affirmative defense. The trial court denied
the motion. The appellate term, in reversing, noted that it had
been generally accepted that the summary proceeding must be
"strictly followed and that there could be no departure from the
mode of trial . . . provided by the statute." 212
The court cited instances in which prior courts had treated a
motion for summary judgment made in a summary proceeding in
different ways so as to achieve a just result. The opinion
continued:
Are we not hypocritical in holding that a motion for summary judgment
is not applicable to a summary proceeding? It would seem that since
the purpose of the summary proceeding is to provide a means for an ex-
peditious determination, anything which will afford even speedier justice
is not opposed to the philosophy of summary proceeding.213
The court noted that there is no justification for making
such a motion unavailable in a summary proceeding. The court
then pointed out that CPLR 3212 permits any party to move for
summary judgment in any action except a matrimonial one. *The
changes made in the transition of Article 83 of the CPA to Article
7 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law were then
cited. Section 1428 of the CPA required a trial by a jury in a
summary proceeding if either party so requested. The new Article
7 of the RPAPL provides a trial only "where triable issues of
fact are raised. .... , 214 Therefore, the court concluded, if there
are no triable issues of fact a summary judgment is proper and
entirely consistent with the purpose of a "summary" proceeding.
The logic of the court's reasoning is unimpeachable. What-
ever distinctions prior law may have made concerning summary
proceedings, there is no justification under the RPAPL or the
CPLR to exclude the summary judgment device from such pro-
211 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 43 Misc. 2d 639,-, 251 N.Y.S.2d
693, 697 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
212 Id. at-, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
213 Id. at-, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
214 RPAPL § 745.
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